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Abstract
Western European politics have been marked over the last
couple of decades by a fierce debate about the place of Europe’s
increasingly large immigrant population in society. Across the
continent, far-right parties campaigning on nationalistic platforms
opposing immigration have seen great electoral success. The
debate is undoubtedly becoming more heated as more immigrants
pour into the area, and these anti-immigrant parties seem to have
established themselves in the political arena. Immigration does
not appear to be slowing down at any point in the near future,
so what is going to happen to these far-right parties as we move
into the future? My research sought to answer this question and
offer a more optimistic outlook on the situation. The most popular
opinions view the relationship between immigrant population size
and anti-immigrant electoral support as a simple positive linear
correlation, meaning that there is little hope that the existing
enmity will do anything but increase. I hoped to show that the
relationship is, in fact, curvilinear. In the case of these immigrants,
a curvilinear relationship would indicate strong xenophobic
voting until the immigrant population becomes so large that the
non-immigrants become more accustomed to the presence of
those that they formerly viewed as “outsiders.” What I discovered
was that an alternative hypothesis provided the best description.
As the immigrant population increased, the support for the far
right actually decreased. This “contact hypothesis” shows that
the increased population leads to increased interaction with
immigrants and the weakening of stereotypes perpetuated by the
extreme right.
Introduction
As Europe moves forward into the 21st century, it faces a
stark new reality. The end of the Cold War, combined with the
burgeoning integration that would lead to the European Union as
we know it today, raised hopes of a more peaceful and successful
Europe for the new millennium. However, issues of migration
did not take long in exposing deep fault lines in this new, unified
European community. Conflicts are no longer along ideological
lines of capitalism versus communism, but rather along lines
of ethnicity and religion. Strong national allegiances are slowly
giving way to concerns and questions about the very nature of
the nation’s identity. The undeniable truth of the past several
decades is that the face of Europe is changing, facilitated in part by
historically low birth rates among so-called “ethnic” Europeans.
Responses to these demographic shifts have varied, with
some viewing them as an opportunity for further development,
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2011

and others seeing them as a challenge to perceived European
values. Some of the most vehement reactions come from far-right
anti-immigrant political parties. Though these groups have yet to
achieve governing status in most governments, their voices have
proven to be very influential in the immigration debate. A mere
glimpse of recent headlines shows this to be true, as a series of
measures have been implemented that disproportionally affect
immigrant communities.
In recent years, European immigration research has focused
on the motivations for anti-immigrant attitudes. Existing studies
have examined the relationship between these attitudes and the
size of the outgroup, in this case, immigrants. This relationship
is typically explained as a result of one of two phenomena:
competition or contact theory, each of which is discussed further.
My aim was to propose and subsequently test a set of hypotheses
which reconcile these two theoretical approaches by incorporating
elements of both into a single parsimonious model. At the center
of my proposed model and the innovative aspect of my research,
is the replacement of the linear models used in both contact and
competition theories with a curvilinear description of the research
question proposed here: what is the relationship between levels
of electoral support for far right anti-immigrant parties and the
size of the immigrant population? I turn first to a discussion of the
patterns of migration in Europe and then of the political responses
to those patterns.
History of the Migrant Influx
The massive migration that marked the second half of the 20th
century in Europe was born out of the rubble of the Second World
War. The reconstruction of a continent ravaged by war required
more than the mere replacement of damaged and destroyed
buildings. Entire economies and societies had to be rebuilt. While
much of the money for the reconstruction efforts was supplied by
the United States through the Marshall Plan, there was not enough
labor to support the rapidly growing economy of the reemerging
Europe. As a result, many countries began to look beyond their
borders to find new workers, actively recruiting through two
primary methods: guest worker programs and colonial migration
regimes.
The clearest example of a nation that used the guest worker
approach is Germany, whose program for Gastarbeiter brought in
workers from southern Europe and beyond, particularly Turkey.
The government established a series of bilateral agreements
with each country to allow workers to move to West Germany
in order to support and drive the economic boom. Between 1955
1
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and 1973 alone, the West German government recruited over 2.5
million of these guest workers (Boswell, 2005). Under the plan,
workers were to return to their home countries during economic
slowdowns, with the hope of returning to Germany once the
economy rebounded. Initially, the Gastarbeiter program saw
spectacular success, and during the first major postwar recession,
many did return to their homelands (Hansen 2003).
The great colonial powers of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries faced many of the same issues as Germany after the war,
but approached the recruitment of labor in a different way in order
to take advantage of the resources provided to them through the
territories still under their rule. Among these were Great Britain,
Belgium, and France. Many of their economies were not seeing
the rapid growth of the Germans or other European powers, and
were thus less attractive to prospective workers. Rather than
initiating bilateral agreements, these countries instead made all
inhabitants of their colonies full citizens (primarily as a result of
other political pressures), granting a host of unskilled laborers
unrestricted movement to the home country (Hansen 2003). Soon
South Asians were pouring into Great Britain, as France saw
similar movement from Algeria, which was technically a part of
the French state rather than a colony.
With the global economic slowdown resulting from
the 1973 oil crisis, the vast majority of economic and labor
immigration ground to a halt. However, rather than stopping the
migrant flow into Europe, this halt simply shifted the reason for
movement. Governments began limiting the influx of workers and
implementing measures to encourage existing workers to move
back to their native countries. However, these measures had the
unintended effect of solidifying the presence of existing workers.
Business owners did not want to lose well-trained and experienced
labor without the hope for replacements willing to work for low
pay. The immigrants themselves were hesitant to leave, fearing
that they would not be able to return once the economy had
regained speed (Lucassen, 2005).
The Germans went so far as to limit the amount given as
family allowances for children abroad, but instead of forcing
the workers to return home, their children came to Germany
(Lucassen, 2005). Across Europe, the primary reason for
migration became family reunification, and the wives, children,
and parents of immigrant workers began to move to rejoin the
young males that had moved to find work. Early attempts by
European governments to limit family immigration were met
with stiff human rights opposition and were often foiled in courts,
thus allowing reunification to move forward. During this period,
the labor migration that did occur was restricted to high skilled
laborers (Geddes, 2003).
The shift to family reunification heavily impacted native
European views of immigrants. Whereas many members of the
first wave of labor immigrants had been tolerated given their
contribution to economic development, the influx of non-working
migrant women, children, and elderly was viewed as more of a
cultural threat. It was at this point that the considerable difference
in birth rates between immigrants and natives began to manifest
itself. The decision of many immigrants to remain in place for
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol12/iss1/6

the long term, coupled with the arrival of their families (and the
resulting offspring), produced a rapidly expanding immigrant
population while native populations stagnated (Statham 2003).
The changing face of Europe will have major consequences
for the future, especially in the area of religion. What was once a
homogenously Christian (overwhelming Roman Catholic) Europe
has already begun to disintegrate, as the major influxes of nonEuropean immigrants come from regions of Africa, the Middle
East, and South Asia with predominantly Muslim populations.
The growth of Islam across Europe is one of the greatest lines of
conflict that has been established between immigrants and native
Europeans. It is a trend playing out across the continent. While
ethnic European birthrates plummet, Muslim immigrant birthrates
remain very high. The total Muslim population of Europe is
projected to double by 2015, while ethnic Europeans are likely to
decline by 3.5 percent. The trend is even larger in cities, many of
which are expected to be half foreign or more within the century
(Shore, 2006).
The Political Response
The growth in immigration has been mirrored in many areas
by a rise of numerous far right anti-immigrant political parties
that have capitalized on a spreading xenophobia within Europe.
These parties are not geographically constrained to a single
country and have gained toeholds in a number of nations that
have long been heralded as examples of liberalism and tolerance.
In fact, one of the most successful examples of this phenomenon
is the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) of Switzerland. In the
2007 federal elections, the SVP was able to garner 28% of the
vote, the highest vote total for any single party in Swiss history.
The SVP has been able to rally support around its extremely
restrictive immigration policies, including a controversial ban
on the construction of minarets that was approved via national
referendum in late 2009. At the time of the vote, there were only
four minarets in the entire country, none of which were used for a
call to prayer (Erlanger, 2009).
Another famous example of a far right party that has
thrived on its anti-immigrant positions is seen in France. The
post-crisis era saw the rise of Front National, a far-right party
that found its cause in the anti-immigrant movement. Led by
archconservative Jean-Marie Le Pen, Front National saw modest
electoral success, consistently exceeding 10% in multiparty
federal elections, and gaining seats in the European Parliament.
Le Pen’s strongest support came as a result of his vocal criticism
of immigrant groups. In 1984, 39% of the National Front voters
cited immigration as their primary concern, and in 1986, this
number jumped to 60% of the same voting group (Golder, 2003).
Today, Front National advocates for the cancellation of family
reunification immigration, shortening the permitted stay from 10
to 3 years, and sending criminals back to the country of origin
(Front National, 2010).
The Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Austrian Freedom
Party, traces its roots all the way back to the Nazi occupation
of Austria. Though it was not officially formed until 1956,
as the conglomeration of three different right-wing groups, it
was strongly associated with the fervently nationalistic and
2
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conservative positions of the Nazi party. It saw little success for
most of the Cold War, typically garnering just 6-7% of the national
vote. By the early 1980s, the party was beginning to splinter, as
many of the more conservative elements were unhappy with the
increasingly liberal leadership of Norbert Steger.
Both the party’s goals and its subsequent fortunes underwent
dramatic shifts in 1986 when Jörg Haider supplanted Steger as
head of the party. It was at this point that the FPÖ began taking
on a more stridently anti-immigrant image, a perception that
Haider readily fostered and used to help boost the party to nearly
10 percent of the vote in November of the same year. Just over
a decade later, the Freedom Party had become a force to be
reckoned with in Austrian politics. It shocked outside observers
by capturing almost 27 percent of the vote in the 1999 federal
elections, enough to push the party into second place and into part
of a governing coalition with the center-right Austrian People’s
Party. Though few parties outside of the government were willing
to deal with the Freedom Party, it managed nonetheless to legislate
a more restrictive immigration policy that ultimately cut asylum
applications by more than a half (Luther, 2004). The following
years saw a tapering off of support for a party that best functioned
as a voice of opposition, and support was further deflated when
Haider himself died in a car accident in 2008.
Interestingly, the United Kingdom and some countries of
Southern Europe have not seen comparable political movements
against immigration. While parties espousing such positions
certainly exist, they have not come close to replicating the success
of Front National or the FPÖ. The reason for this lack of success
is unclear. It may be a result of any number of differences across
European nations, ranging from structural factors, like minor
party access to the ballot, to individual level factors, such as voter
tolerance or lack thereof.
Several existing studies analyzing support for extreme right
parties (ERPs) at the individual level, for example, have pointed
out the strong positive correlation between anti-immigrant or
xenophobic attitudes and a voter’s likelihood to support an ERP
candidate (Lubbers, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Knigge 1998).
As Kessler (2005) points out, the relationship is rather selfevident: “These prospective extreme right voters express a host
of imagined or real grievances, blaming migrants for perceived
reductions in the quality of children’s education, abuse of the
welfare system, increases in unemployment, and rises in crime,
violence, and delinquency” (273).
One key analytical advantage that researchers in the area are
presented with is the aforementioned variability across European
countries in terms of ERP support, since it allows us to hold
certain variables relatively constant while others vary. I return
to this theme in my research design section, which follows a
discussion of current theoretical explanations for the growth in
anti-immigrant sentiments.

al. 2002, Alexseev 2006). It is based in the concept of realistic
group conflict theory, which seeks to explain the tensions between
groups seeking resources and power in a society (Coser 1956,
Duke 1976). Essentially, when one group has access to limited
resources, any increase in demand for those resources (i.e. the
arrival of an outgroup) becomes a threat to those that originally
had access, the ingroup. The closer the relationship between the
two groups, the more vigorous the competition between them
becomes. Thus, as the size of an outgroup increases, the contact
that individuals in the ingroup have with them increases as well.
Elevated awareness of the existence of the outgroup in turn leads
to an escalation in the level of competition, manifesting itself in
increased hostility towards the newcomers (Banton, 1983).
According to competition theory then, migration directly
results in an antagonistic relationship between ingroup and
outgroup. The basis upon which members of each group delineate
themselves from the ‘other’ may be language, ethnicity, or
religion. Distinctions such as these help to clearly delineate the
boundaries between ingroup and outgroup, thus eliminating the
possibility of boundary dissolution over time.
The question of ethnic competition then turns to the matter
of the resources that are being fought over. Some studies have
focused primarily on competition for basic needs and resources.
Included in this grouping would be issues such as employment and
access to education, among other government provided services
(Campbell 1965; Sherif 1966). A less tangible but no less potent
resource may be that of culture and identity (Tajfel and Turner
1979).
France’s long simmering immigration debate has featured
both of these types of resource conflicts, laid bare with tragic
consequences in the tumultuous autumn of 2005. In that year, the
deaths of two immigrant teenagers sparked a series of riots around
Paris and across the country. Thousands of cars were burned by
rioters that were predominantly young immigrant men. What had
started as anger over the deaths boiled over into a national crisis as
the riots became an outlet for many of these working-age men to
express their frustrations at the lack of employment opportunities
available to them. According to Ford, immigrant rage at pernicious
discrimination and dismal job prospects provides an unequivocal
example of materialistic competition (Ford, 2005).
Equally contentious was the issue of the 2004 ban on the
wearing of headscarves in public schools. Some native French
view the headscarf as a symbol of outsiders amongst them, fearing
a loss of identity as that population grows. Regardless of the
source of inter-group competition, the consequences are similar if
not identical.

Theoretical Perspectives

Thus, according to competition theory, increases in the
size of the outgroup, in this case immigrants, will coincide with
proportional increases in electoral support for ERPs as a result
of increased threat to the ingroup’s resource pool. The resulting
relationship will be a positive and linear.

Competition Theory

Contact Theory

Currently, of the two common explanations for antiimmigrant attitudes, the predominant one is the idea of ethnic
competition (Knigge 1998, Lubbers et al. 2002, Scheepers et
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2011

Contact theory posits the opposite effect, arguing that the
size of the outgroup actually has a negative relationship with
anti-immigrant attitudes. In simple terms, it is easy to vote for
3
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parties that demonize immigrants when one has little contact with
those immigrants. As an unknown specter, immigrants can take
on whatever characteristics an ERP may wish to apply to them.
However, once a voter has contact with immigrants, they are able
to make the judgment for themselves, and their conclusion rarely
coincide with public portrayals put forth by ERPs.
Williams (1947) points out that most actions undertaken to
resolve intergroup conflict rest upon the assumption that increased
contact results in personal connections that overcome the
competition impulse. McLaren (2003) found evidence to support
this theory in the case of European immigration. In her research,
those who had multiple immigrant friends perceived the general
immigrant community to be a lesser threat than those who had no
contact with immigrants.
Early research on the contact hypothesis posited that it only
applied in very limited circumstances that were rarely seen.
Conditions put forth by Allport (1954) included equal status,
common goals, and support for contact from authority. In many of
the migration situations seen in Europe, meeting these conditions
was practically impossible. Later work expanded on Allport’s,
saying that contact could increase anti-outgroup sentiment just as
much as it could decrease it. Amir (1969) makes this point, citing
some of the component ideas of realistic group conflict theory. He
then develops Allport’s conditions, positing that the contact must
be desired, and that it can either occur between members of equal
status or a member of the majority and a outgroup member of
even higher social status. This difference in socioeconomic status
is an important distinction in assessing the validity of contact
theory. Essentially, it states that horizontal contact, such as that
between a Moroccan immigrant worker and his working-class
Dutch neighbor, will result in a much greater shift in attitude than
the vertical contact between a wealthy Austrian family and their
Turkish house workers.
However, more recent research has shown that contact does
not have to occur under such stringent settings. Pettigrew (1998)
found that even relatively coincidental contact could result in
improved relations between ingroup and outgroup. An earlier
study in German schools had found similar results, tying leisure
time and the incidental contact with Turks that it provided to
decreasing prejudice against the outgroup (Wagner, Hewstone, &
Machleit, 1989).
A Tipping Point?
While the competition versus contact theoretical debate has
been going on for some time now, there has been little research
into a middle ground between the two. Both sides certainly have
considerable research and evidence to back up their claims, but
interaction between them is notably absent. This is particularly
interesting given that both hypotheses seem to fall apart as we
approach their extremes. Under ethnic competition theory, a
population fully saturated with immigrants would have the highest
rates of anti-immigrant voting, a clearly illogical conclusion as
these immigrants would be unlikely to vote against their own
interests. On the other hand, the contact hypothesis faces issues at
the opposite extreme: completely homogenous communities, those
devoid of immigrants, would hypothetically have the highest rates
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol12/iss1/6

of support for anti-immigrant parties. Again, this does not follow,
as the community would assumedly have very little cause to vote
against a nonexistent population.
In almost all of the existing literature, the assumption of
linearity seems to be taken as a certainty rather than as a part of
the hypothesis. Schlueter and Scheepers (2009) even conducted
a study testing both hypotheses simultaneously on the same
data, finding significant support for both theories. Despite this
seemingly contradictory result, the authors failed to present any
challenge to the linear model. The possibility of a curvilinear
relationship, made up of the simultaneously acting theories, offers
a potential solution to this contradiction.
Such an idea has been put forward by Schneider (2007) but
even Schneider did not seem to think that the relationship was
entirely curvilinear, in that she predicted a “tapering off” of ERP
voting rather than a decrease. Her study looked at the issue at the
national level, analyzing 20 different EU countries. Two other
authors have recently found evidence for a curve, but both are
in limited settings. Rather than focusing on all non-European
immigrants as the outgroup, one study zeroed in on Muslim
immigrants in the Netherlands, and the other looked only at the
performance of the Vlaams Blok in Belgium (Rink et al. 2009;
Savelkoul, et al. 2010). Again, in both of the cases, the curve
seemed to be more of a tapering off than a decrease in support for
the extreme right.
Hypotheses
The first two hypotheses that I tested stemmed from the
predominant theories of competition and contact. The decreasing
access to resources referenced in competition theory indicates
a positive linear relationship between immigrant population
size and ERP voting, the relationship presented in my first
hypoth esis. Contact theory led to my second hypothesis, which
asserts that increasing immigrant population size will lead, in
turn, to increased opportunities for contact and interaction, thus
decreasing xenophobia and electoral support for ERPs. Whereas
the first hypothesis was a positive linear relationship, this second
hypothesis postulates instead a negative linear relationship.
A curvilinear relationship would indicate that ethnic
competition begins as the stronger factor, driving anti-immigrant
sentiment for a time, but once the outgroup population reaches a
certain size, the augmented opportunities for interaction with the
ingroup lead to a strengthening of the contact theory, bringing the
curve back down after a maximum point of anti-immigrant voting.
This curvilinear relationship became my third hypothesis to be
tested, and in doing so I both incorporated existing theories and
also posited a relationship that would fill a gap that heretofore has
existed in the literature on ERP support and immigration.
Levels of Analysis
One of the very important matters that had to be addressed
in this case was the level of analysis. In the existing literature,
the scope of studies varied from continent-wide, analyzing at the
national level and including various examples (Lubbers 2002),
to looking at subnational units as small as counties in a single
country (Alexseev, 2006). The level chosen can have a significant
impact on the results, as it also indicates a shift in the resource
4
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pool referred to for competition theory. As Quillian (1996) points
out, “The correct unit at which to measure the influences is
difficult to define precisely, since people probably picture relations
between their own racial group and other racial groups at more
than one level (city, state, region, or nation) depending on the
context.”
This debate also brings into account a previously mentioned
issue about the contact hypothesis, and that is the question of
the nature of the contact. If growing immigrant populations are
confined to ethnic ghettoes, it becomes very unlikely that voters
will have the opportunity for chance interactions that would
hypothetically be expected to shift their attitudes. In some cases,
it may even serve to intensify competition as it adds geography to
the list of factors that can be used to draw the boundary between
ingroup and outgroup.
A substantial portion of the existing research also looks at the
issue at the individual level, examining individual socioeconomic,
demographic, and opinion data to see its effect on anti-immigrant
voting. For example, McLaren (2003) explores the relationship
using survey responses that discuss the threat perception of
individual voters, and then links it with immigrant contact
and ERP support. Other studies that bring economic level and
education into account have shown a significant relationship
between those factors and ERP support, and unlike threat
perception, these factors can be analyzed easily at a level greater
than the individual, and thus were incorporated into my analysis.
In this research, data was analyzed at the first-order civil
division level for each nation (the level of administration just
below the central state government), as previous research has
shown the effect of immigration on voting patterns to be higher
when evaluated at the level of smaller units (Alexseev 2006).
Additionally, subnational analysis appeared more warranted since
public opinion is very rarely homogenous at the national level, but
often does begin to demonstrate more convergence as the unit of
analysis decreases.1 Breaking from the typical approach taken by
researchers in this field, I concentrated on the subnational analysis,
but it spanned across four different case nations in order to test the
hypotheses in more varied environments.
The scales and autonomy of first-order civil divisions among
my cases varied substantially. The simplest measure of regions
is the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS)
established by the European Union for the purposes of EuroStat,
the EU statistical database. The NUTS for all EU countries are
divided into 4 levels: NUTS 0 is the national level, NUTS 1 is
the next largest, then down to the smallest NUTS 3 divisions. For
most of these countries, NUTS 1 is simply an agglomeration of
administrative regions with little meaning in the national context.
In Austria, Spain, and Belgium, NUTS 2 actually corresponds
directly with the first order administrative regions.
However, the NUTS designations for the United Kingdom do
in fact correspond with a relevant layer of administration, namely

Government Office Regions, Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland.2 Furthermore, while boundaries of lower NUTS levels
typically correspond with voting districts, this is not so in the UK,
thus necessitating the use of the NUTS 1 level in its case. Since
the data for the control variables all came from an EU database,
the indicator variables are all defined within the NUTS regions
and using smaller divisions than NUTS 1 would have introduced
a great deal of error into the models. Therefore, I worked at the
NUTS 2 level in all countries except the United Kingdom. Even
given this apparent disparity, there was a rough balance across
case nations as each country included between 10 and 20 regions
at the specified levels. As well, there was complete balance
in terms of the number of elections analyzed with two cycles
examined for each of the case countries, thus yielding a total
number of 100 observations.
The dependent variable in this case was the percentage of
votes garnered by extreme right parties in European Parliament
elections. Using the results of a survey conducted by Lubbers
(2000), I was able to classify parties in each country. The survey
polled 150 European political scientists, asking them to place
parties on a left to right ideological scale with 1 being far left and
10 being far right, and to rank these parties by the restrictiveness
of their proposed immigration policies. I focused exclusively on
parties that qualify as “extreme right” on both of these measures,
those with a score greater than nine on each scale.
On the basis of Lubbers’ scale, I chose four countries for my
analysis: Belgium, Spain, Austria, and the United Kingdom. There
were actually six parties in the final analysis, given the division of
Belgium between the Dutch-speaking Flanders and francophone
Wallonia as well as the existence of two Spanish extreme right
parties on Lubbers’ scale. The parties were: Vlaams Blok (VP) of
Flanders, Front National (FN) of Wallonia, the British National
Party (BNP), Democracia Nacional (DN) and the Falange
Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FE
de las JONS) of Spain, and the Freiheitlicht Partei Österreichs
(FPÖ) of Austria. Over the span of time that I measured, some of
these parties saw significant organizational changes. For example,
the Vlaams Blok actually became the Vlaams Belang as of late
2004 after a court ruled that the Blok had violated laws against
xenophobic incitement.
Immigrant population size can be measured in a variety of
ways, but for the purposes of this research, I defined that variable
as the percentage of non-European Union legal residents. This
is because the lack of border controls between EU countries, a
result of the 1984 Schengen agreement, makes internal migration
more fluid and thus more difficult to measure with precision.
Also, the ethnic and cultural boundaries between groups involved
in conflict are more substantial with non-EU migrants than
with other EU members. While an Italian immigrant in France
may face considerable difficulty with regards to language, he is
still navigating in a society very similar to his own, with nearly
identical values. The same cannot be said for an Algerian in

1

Unfortunately, I did not have access to individual level data in these areas. Any analysis of the results of this research must therefore
avoid the ecological fallacy, that is, using the behavior of the group as a whole to predict the action of an individual.
2
Northern Ireland was eliminated from the analysis given that the British National Party did not run in their elections.
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France. His color, accent and faith all set him apart from the rest
of the “native” population, and he is much more likely to evoke a
response as he is more clearly a member of the outgroup under the
provisions of realistic group contact theory. While a measure of
immigrant population that included illegal immigrants would be
ideal, this information is understandably difficult to attain with any
measure of validity.
My analysis involved model estimations using multivariate
ordinary least squares regression. The models provided
coefficients that indicated the relationship between the dependent
variable and the independent variables. Since I hypothesized
a curvilinear relationship between extreme right support and
our primary predictor variable, outgroup size, I introduced a
quadratic term (squaring the immigrant population size) to test
for curvilinearity. While the numerical values associated with this
squared term provide little useful information, the sign of the term
will tell us whether or not a curve is present. A positive linear
coefficient in combination with a negative quadratic coefficient
indicates a curvilinear relationship of the sort predicted in my
hypothesis (i.e., one resembling the classic normal bell curve).
I also tested for linear relationships with other variables,
drawn from the existing research literature on the topic of extreme
right electoral support, in order to account for their effect on the
general trends. While education level is one of the most widely
used predictors of this support, I included income level, economic
status, and urbanization, as discussed in the following section.
Cases and Data
My dependent variable was the percentage vote received
by the ERPs in the European Parliamentary elections of 2004
and 2009 respectively, derived using information contained in
the European Election Database (Norwegian Social Science
Data Services, 2011). There are two reasons that the European
Parliament elections were used as valid measures of support for
this study. 3
The first is the centralization of migration-related powers that
has occurred over the past two decades. The EU is seeking to and
has succeeded in broadening its capability to deal with migration
as a Europe-wide issue (Geddes, 2003). The immigration debate
has been cast in terms of a monolithic European culture by
many of the extreme right parties analyzed here. As put by Geert
Wilders in a speech to the British House of Lords regarding
Muslim immigration, largely Turkish and North African: “Islam
means submission, there cannot be any mistake about its goal.
That’s a given. The question is whether we in Europe and you
in Britain, with your glorious past, will submit or stand firm for
your heritage” (Wilders, 2010). As the identity set in conflict with
the immigrant is defined as a pan-European one with a common
heritage, it would make sense that voters in perceived conflict with

the outgroup would seek solutions at the Europe-wide level.
The second strength of EP election data is the increased
influence that the body has wielded in the last decade. The 2004
and 2009 elections followed a period of growth resulting from
the treaties of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Voting reforms had
strengthened the Parliament in comparison with the powerful
European Commission and Council of Ministers, with the codecision process giving it an essential veto on many important
policy matters. A turning point for the institution came in 1998
when, after years of largely rubber-stamp work, the Parliament
refused the budget of EU Commissioner Jacques Santer and
eventually forced the resignation of his entire commission due to
allegations of corruption and gross mismanagement (Topan, 2002).
With a newly empowered Parliament, it is much more likely that
voters in recent years would see the body as a potential agent of
change to a greater degree than they had prior to 1992.
The makeup of the non-EU immigrant populations in these
countries also provided an interesting and useful comparison. The
United Kingdom, as a result of its colonial legacy, is primarily
a destination for South Asian immigrants. Austria has a more
varied makeup. Following the example of its neighbor Germany, it
recruited massive numbers of Turkish workers, but there are also
sizeable numbers of former Balkan residents who moved to flee
the wars there during the 1990s. Spain, unlike the others, has many
immigrants from Latin America as it is a natural destination for the
continent’s Spanish speakers. Its geographic proximity to North
Africa has also led to large Moroccan and Algerian communities
in some areas. Belgium’s immigrants are also primarily Moroccan,
though they live alongside a considerable Turkish population as
well, and were recruited as guest workers.
The four selected countries provided the opportunity to test
my hypotheses across a range of demographic configurations. The
proportion of immigrants of non-European origin in Belgium is
only 2.9%, the lowest of the four and among the lowest in Western
Europe, whereas Austria has the largest foreign presence of the
four, nearly 7% of their populace (see Table 1 for descriptive
statistics). The cases also show variance on the side of the
dependent variable, as far-right parties like the Vlaams Blok and
the Freedom Party have seen considerable success in Belgium and
Austria, whereas the Spanish anti-immigrant party, Democracia
Nacional, has never generated a significant amount of support.
Choosing an accurate measure of the education levels in
each region proved to be a challenge. As with all of the variables,
there are no individual level measures for participating voters,
so I needed some contextual measure of education levels for the
region as a whole. The data that I used came from the quarterly
Labor Force Survey (LFS) conducted by member nations under
the auspices of EU control. “The EU LFS is a large household
sample survey providing quarterly results on labor participation
of people aged 15 and over as well as on persons outside the

3

European Parliament elections are under the control of member countries, but provide a more standardized measure. They enable us
to eliminate variation introduced by time differences that may have occurred between individual national elections. Elections consist of
national parties who then sit in large ideological coalitions once seated in Parliament. The extreme right parties analyzed here all sit as
non-inscrits, not part of any coalition.
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol12/iss1/6

6

Walchuk: Immigration and the Extreme Right: An Analysis of Recent Voting T

30  inquiry  Volume 12

2011

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the model.
Variable

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Percent support for ERPs

100

.04

27.47

5.64

6.31

Percentage of immigrants

100

.72

13.60

4.57

3.41

Unemployment Rate

100

2.90

26.20

9.28

5.41

Percentage with Tertiary
Education

100

12.52

48.54

27.52

7.53

Gross Domestic Product per
capita (indexed to EU average)

100

60

256

112.05

34.10

Percentage of region with low
urbanization

100

.00

1.00

.25

.24

Valid N (listwise)

100

labor force. All definitions apply to persons aged 15 years and
over living in private households” (EuroStat, 2010). The highest
level of education attained was defined on the education levels of
the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED),
established by UNESCO in 1997.
The LFS data aggregates these levels into three groups:
respondents with only primary level education or none at all,
respondents who have completed secondary education, and
respondents who have completed tertiary education, be it
university or some kind of professional degree. The figures used
in this study represent percentages of the total respondents and
exclude respondents in the 15-24 age bracket. The logic of this
exclusion is that such individuals would in the first instance likely
still be pursuing completion of their secondary or tertiary studies,
and in the second instance, those under 18 would not have been
eligible to vote in the elections being analyzed.
Two different measures were used to determine the impact
of economic context upon the dependent variables. The first,
unemployment rate, provided a measure of economic competition
at the contextual level. Competition theory would predict a
positive relationship between the unemployment rate and ERP
support, as greater numbers of people looking for jobs would
theoretically lead to a heightened sense of competition with the
outgroup.
The other economic measure provided a sense of income
distribution between regional units. This data also comes from
EuroStat’s Labor Force Survey, as I utilized the Gross Domestic
Product per capita of each region4. To avoid the cross-national
distortions that using raw amounts would introduce, I indexed
the amounts to the average regional GDP per capita for the entire
European Union, setting it equal to 100 and normalizing the other
values around it. All amounts were measured in Euros to account
for differences in exchange rates.
The final control variable included was a measure of
urbanization. While not frequently cited as an important factor in
the literature, I included it because of the role that segregation of
outgroup communities can play in both competition and contact

theories. As Massey and Denton (1989) find in the case of the
United States, the segregation of black communities actually
increased when one looks at more metropolitan areas. On a
basic level, this makes sense since urban areas would be more
likely magnets for immigration and thus have larger immigrant
populations. The larger population can then in turn lead to a
more self-sufficient outgroup community. The effect of this
“ghettoization” is the same under both contact and competition
theory. It both limits opportunities for contact and deepens lines of
division, leading to more ERP support in both cases.
The data on urbanization levels also came from the Labor
Force Survey. It provides the number of households in each region
based on the population density of their immediate area. There are
three levels of urbanization: densely populated (more than 500
inhabitants per square kilometer), intermediate (between 100 and
499 inhabitants per square kilometer), and sparsely populated (less
than 100 inhabitants per square kilometer). To facilitate analysis,
I turned each of these numbers into percentages of the total
respondents divided by urbanization level.
Results
I estimated two separate models using SPSS statistical
analysis software. Results are displayed in Table 2. The first
model tested my first two hypotheses regarding the apparently
contradictory linear predictions of contact versus competition
theory. As both of these hypothesized relationships were linear,
the quadratic term was not included. All of the tested variables
were significant at the .01 level except for the unemployment rate.
The model had a very robust adjusted R-square value of 0.489,
meaning that the model could account for 48.9% of the variation
across cases. The negative estimated coefficient on the predictor
variable, percentage of immigrants, indicates decreasing electoral
support for the ERPs as immigrant population increases, thus
leading me to reject my first hypothesis. My second hypothesis
based upon contact theory, by contrast, is supported by the
regression analysis.
Model II introduced a quadratic term to test my third
Table 2. Regression results displaying independent variables, estimated coefficient
(expressing probability to vote for an extreme right party) and standard error in
parentheses; (N= 100)
Variable

Model I

Model II

Constant

10.631 (3.128)**

13.212 (3.647)**

-0.817 (0.196)**

-1.569 (.586)**

Percentage of immigrants
2

(Percentage of immigrants)

0.062 (.046)

Percentage with tertiary level education

-0.333 (0.078)**

-0.346 (0.078)**

Percentage of region with low
urbanization

-8.250 (2.294)**

-8.119 (2.286)**

Unemployment Rate

-0.178 (.117)

-0.192 (0.117)

Gross Domestic Product per capita
(indexed to EU average)

0.104 (.022)**

0.098 (0.023)**

4

One important caveat to the use of GDP per capita is that, given its nature as an average, outliers, typically high outliers, can throw it
off and thus it may not provide a full picture of regional income without distribution data.
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2011
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hypothesis, which posits a curvilinear relationship between
immigrant population size and ERP support. The adjusted
R-square value was marginally higher: 0.499. In this model, we
see a stronger negative correlation with the linear term, but the
squared term is not significant. The results of the second model
provided greater support for my second hypothesis than for either
of the other two hypothesized models, including my curvilinear
one.
Discussion
Hypotheses
The strong evidence for contact theory provided by my
regression models was initially a surprise, as ethnic competition
has been the more dominant theory in much of the existing corpus
of literature on the issue. Some aspects of the predictor variable,
outgroup size, may have contributed to this result.
The first of these is the matter of my definition of the variable.
Due to the limitations of available data, I was unable to get a full
sense of the outgroup size. For example, I could not include illegal
immigrants or immigrants that have been naturalized and left their
original citizenship behind. While this information is available
at the national level (Schneider, 2007) and occasionally at lower
levels in specific circumstances (Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma,
& Hagendoorn, 2010), there are no comparable data on these
other segments of the migrant community at the regional level.
It is quite possible that the communities with a smaller foreign
national community have a large naturalized population that still
functions as an outgroup, but goes unaccounted for in this model.
Subsequent inquiries would be much enhanced with measurements
of both the illegal and naturalized communities, as they would
enable a more rigorous testing for the presence of a curvilinear
relationship.
The second issue that may have contributed to my
unexpected results is the absence of significant time differences
in measurement. While the hypothesized curve does not include
an explicit temporal measure indicator, it is possible that shifting
contextual circumstances may mitigate the competition effect over
time. As discussed earlier, immigration has long been framed as
a Europe-wide issue, and the recession of the 1970s that began
much of the backlash against immigration affected the continent as
a whole. The presence of these extreme right parties, regardless of
their levels of success, has been a feature of the European political
landscape since that era. Ethnic competition theory proposes that
increasing migrant presence increases awareness of conflict, thus
deepening anti-immigrant sentiment. Given the extensive nature
of anti-immigrant rhetoric that had existed for years before the
elections analyzed in this study, perhaps the awareness of conflict
had already been maximized, regardless of immigrant presence.
Such a situation would leave decreases in anti-immigrant voting
resulting from contact as the only effect significantly related with
the size of the outgroup.
Other Variables of Interest
Most of the relationships with the independent control
variables found in these results are consistent with the
conventional wisdom of existing immigration research. I decided
to use only tertiary education as the educational measure based
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol12/iss1/6

on support in the existing literature regarding what aspects of
education impact outgroup perceptions. Hainmueller and Hiscox
(2007) found that “college education has far greater positive
effects on support for immigration than high school education, and
finishing elementary schooling actually appears to have negative
effects on support for immigration“ (Hainmueller, 2007, p. 424).
The negative correlation coefficient on the education variable
seems to support Hainmueller’s finding that as the percentage of
the population that has completed university or comparable studies
rises, district-wide (not individual) support for ERPs decreases.
The relationship with urbanization levels also follows the
expected pattern. Assuming that ghettoization could occur even in
mid-sized urban areas, I utilized the low urbanization level data to
explore the relationship with ERP voting. Given that the data used
is a percentage that sums to one when combined with intermediate
and high urbanization, higher percentages of sparsely populated
area mean fewer people living in urban areas, and thus fewer
opportunities for segregation. The results illustrate a very strong
relationship between ERP vote and urbanization. As the proportion
of the population living in sparsely populated areas increases, ERP
support drops dramatically.
Unemployment was the only control variable included in the
models that did not turn out to be statistically significant. In fact,
this too coincides with preceding research. Numerous studies
found unemployment rate to have an insignificant effect on ERP
voting or threat perception (Lubbers et al. 2002; Scheepers,
Gijsberts and Coenders 2002; Rink et al. 2009). However, several
of these also found that, when occupational status was included at
the individual level, unemployment did have a significant effect,
at least on threat perception. Given that such individual measures
were beyond the scope of this study, there is little alternative
to accepting that at least at the regional level, unemployment
is a poor indicator of community-wide anti-immigrant voting
proclivities.
The coefficent associated with income, measured here using
GDP per capita, presents a more complex issue. It was significant,
but indicated a positive relationship. That is, as the income
increased, so did the support for ERPs. Given the previously stated
relationship with tertiary education, this may seem contradictory,
since the wealthier are typically better educated. In fact, though, it
does fit with the tenets of contact theory. Recall that the literature
indicates that there exist two kinds of contact. Ameliorative
effects only derive from horizontal, not vertical, contact. As
Amir (1969) emphasizes, the equal status of those involved
in contact is essential. As income rises, one is less likely to
encounter an immigrant of equal socioeconomic status, since most
immigrants initially enter in pursuit of low salary work. Under
such conditions, the contact becomes increasingly vertical with
increasing income, and thus less effective. As we have already
found contact theory to be the dominant phenomenon at play in
this case, the income relationship ultimately does comport with
expectations.
Conclusion
Though the hypothesized curve did not find support in this
study, the results still provide considerable reason for optimism in
8
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Europe’s coming years. The dominance of contact theory, whether
it is in fact simply the downward portion of a curve that reached
its maximum in the past or if it is truly the stronger phenomenon
at play, is encouraging. The migrant influx shows no real signs
of slowing, and Europe will be required to adapt to the presence
of this new community as the community itself adapts to its new
surroundings. My findings indicate that they are doing just that.

Ford, P. (2005, November 4). Deep roots of Paris riots. Christian
Science Monitor.

Though further research will be required to discover if
national general election data matches that of the European
Parliament elections analyzed here, the trend is occurring as
the EP grows in influence and capacity. My results may not
inform the impending policies of individual nations, but as the
European Union is taking on a more active role in the integration
of the immigration regimes of member nations, it seems that
restrictive anti-immigrant parties will hold less sway in the
creation of the common policy. These results are also important
for those ultimately charged with the creation of such policies.
While electoral support of ERPs is just one of many measures
of xenophobia, this study indicates that programs that encourage
contact may aid in integration of immigrants. Irrespective of the
national milieu, environs that facilitate greater contact between
natives and migrants, particularly horizontal contact, will coincide
with decreases in support for those who use xenophobia as a
political cudgel in pursuit of elected office.

Golder, M. (2003, May). Explaining Variation in the Success of
Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 36(4), 432-466.
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of course, go on for pages pointing out in detail how well
conceived, constructed and presented Andrew’s work is, but
instead would like to address two facets of his experience that,
to me, represent the drive and temerity that lies at his essence.

Savelkoul, M., Scheepers, P., Tolsma, J., & Hagendoorn, L.
(2010). Anti-Muslim Attitudes in The Netherlands: Tests of
Contradictory Hypotheses Derived from Ethnic Competition
Theory and Intergroup Contact Theory. European Sociological
Review, 1-18.

The first facet is the extraordinary degree to which Andrew
attacked this very ambitious process. From the start, he never
looked back, never retreated and never wilted in the face of
daunting challenges. We determined early on (actually, in
the spring of his junior year) that, in order to appropriately
and rigorously test his hypotheses, fairly sophisticated
quantitative skills would be needed. As he did not at the
time have these skills and as I am generously described as
being semi-literate in this area, what did he do? First, he
enrolled in an advanced statistical analysis course during
his fall senior semester. Then, as he ventured deeper into
his analysis, he arranged personal meetings with a faculty
specialist who, no doubt impressed by this young man’s selfdrive and ambition, quickly agreed to tutor Andrew. Later, as
he was gathering data, he found gaps in the availability of
critical measures for a single case, so what did he do? Rather
than simply discard the case and pursue an ‘easier’ one, he
directly called electoral authorities in the relevant country.
They quite helpfully provided the necessary data and Andrew,
as ever, kept moving forward. This is who he is; voracious for
knowledge, relentless in the face of obstacles and possessed of
an intellect that is one of the sharpest that I have seen in my
professional life. As I tell anyone who will listen, Andrew was
a colleague, not a student. I was only along for the ride and a
fantastic one at that.
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The second facet represents to me the most significant
contribution of this work to academia most broadly conceived.
To put it in very simple terms, Andrew did his research the
way it should be done. This may sound puzzling, but the
disturbing truth is that we in our disciplines all too often
actually pervert the process of scientific inquiry. How? By
‘creatively’ selecting our cases, by ‘torturing’ the data and
worst of all, by starting with our conclusions then working
our way backwards. Why? Because our professional lives are
driven by publication and our journals abet the corruption
of research by generally refusing to publish negative
results. Andrew, and especially this journal, deserve our
highest accolades for having the courage to accept that
his hypotheses were not supported by the evidence. This is
genuine and pure scholarship and confronted by Andrew’s
example, we in academia, including me, should collectively
hang our heads in shame.

Mentor Comments: Professor Jeffrey Ryan’s enthusiasm and
respect for Andrew’s work is clear in the following mentor comments.
From my perspective, not only as an advisor but a scholar
as well, Andrew Walchuk’s thesis is an exemplar of how an
undergraduate student can conduct first-rate scholarship
when they commit themselves fully to the endeavor. I have
supervised many, many honors theses in my 20-year career
here and, quite simply, this is the very best of them all. I could,
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/inquiry/vol12/iss1/6
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